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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
S. W. MORRISON, JR., Co-Administrator of the 
Estate of Fannie P. Morrison, deeeased, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Vs. 
WALKER BANK & TRUST CO~IP ANY, a cor-
poration, Administrator with the Will Annexed 
of the Estate of Chauncey P. Overfield, also 
known as C. P. Overfield, deceased, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
STATEME:NT OF FACTS 
Fannie P. Morrison died on the 28th day of Novem-
ber, 1941. On the 6th day of Decernber, 1941, a petition 
for Letters of Administration upon her estate was filed 
in the District Court of Salt Lake County, by S. W. 
Morrison, Jr., a son of the decedent, and lone l\1. Over-
field, a daughter of the decedent, requesting their ap-
pointment as administrators. On the 20th day of April, 
1942, Letters of Administration upon her estate were 
issued to S. W. 1\Iorrison, Jr., and lone l\f. Overfield, 
and since said tirne they have continued to act as such 
administrators. 
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In the petition it is alleged that the estate of the 
decedent consists of notes, accounts receivable, and 
choses in action, of the value of $4,000.00. No inven-
tory of the 'estate has ever been filed, (See Probate File 
Fannie P. Morrison), although under Section 75-7-1, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the administrator must file 
and make a return to the Court, within three months 
after his appointment, a true inventory and appraise-
ment of the ·estate of the decedent which has come to 
his knowledge and possession. 
Chauncey P. Overfield died on the 14th day of 
July, 1958. He died leaving a will, which was admitted 
to probate in the District Court of Salt Lake County. 
lone M. Overfield, his wife, was named as executrix 
thereof. She, however, waived her right to act as such 
executrix and petitioned for the appointment of Walker 
Banll & Trust Company as Administrator with the Will 
annexed. Walker Bank & Trust Company was appoin-
ted and qualified as such administrator with the Will 
annexed on the 7th day of August, 1958. Since then 
the Bank has acted as such administrator. 
Notice to Creditors in relation to the Overfield 
Estate was published as required by law, and on the 
29th day of January, 1959, the last day for presentation 
of claims, there was presented to the Administrator of 
the Overfield Estate, a Creditor's Claim by S. W. Mor-
rison, Jr., as co-administrator of the Estate of Fannie 
P. Morrison, deceased. The claim is for $44,415.34, and 
is purportedly for 16,395 shares of stock of Independent 
Coal and Coke Company, at $1.00 per share par value, 
or $16,395.00, and for dividends purportedly retained 
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over and above complete discharge of obligation for 
which the above stock was claimed to have been pledged 
as collateral, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum 
to January 20, 1959, in the amount of $28,020.34. The 
claim was disallowed and rejected by the Walker Bank 
& Trust Company as administrator of the estate of 
Chauncey P. Overfield on the 29th day of January, 
1959, and notice of rejection of the clairn was given to 
S. W. Morrison, Jr., co-administrator of the Estate 
of Fannie P. Morrison, deceased, by the Walker Bank 
& Trust Company as Administrator with the Will An-
nexed, and notice of rej·ection of sucl1 claim was filed 
with the Clerk of the District Court of Salt Lake 
County, on the 30th day of January, 1959. 
On the 29th day of April, 1959, S. W. Morrison, 
Jr., as co-administrator of the Estate of Fannie P. 
Morrison, deceased, filed a complaint in the District 
Court of Salt Lake County, against the R·espondent 
herein, for an accounting of stock alleged to have been 
converted by the decedent, Chauncey P. Overfield, and 
for judgment against the W allter Bank & Trust Com-
pany, as such administrator in the amount of $44,415.34, 
plus interest and costs, and later by an an1ended com-
paint it was alleged by S. W. Morrison, Jr., co-adminis-
trator of the Estate of Fannie P. :1£orrison, deceased, 
that Fannie P. Morrison had borrowed son1e $3,500.00 
from Chauncey P. Overfield, and to secure the payment 
thereof had delivered to the said Chauncey P. Over-
field, as Trust;ee under an express trust or a trust im-
plied by law, approximately 16,136 shares of capital 
stock of Independent Coal and Coke Company, with a 
further allegation that the stock was to be held by him 
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as such trustee until said loan shall have been repaid 
through the application of dividends declared upon the 
stock. 
The amended complaint further alleges that during 
the lifetime of Chauneey P. Overfield, he received divi-
dends from said stock sufficient to re-pay the loan and 
interest on said purp~ed loan, and the amended com-
plaint alleges that he refused to return the stock to 
the plaintiff or to acount for the value of it; that the 
stock was transferred between May and November, 1941 
to lone M. Overfield and to the two daughters of Over-
field. It is claimed that Fannie P. Morrison and S. W. 
Morrison, Jr., as such administrator, had no knowledge 
of such transfers. 
The Walker Bank & Trust Company, as administra-
tor with the Will annexed of the decedent, Chauncey P. 
Overfield, denies that a loan was ever made by Overfield 
to Fannie P. Morrison, as allleged herein, denies that 
Overfield ever received stock in his lifetime, or that there 
was a trust ever created as alleged, and denies that he 
transferred, or caused to be transferred, the stock al-
legedly belonging to Fannie P. Morrison, to lone M. 
Overfield, his wife, and to his daughters, and sets up 
further defenses which will be set forth in the argument. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL, COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO PERMIT TE.STIMONY TO BE GIVEN BY S. W. 
MORRISON AND lONE M. OVERFIELD UNDER 
SECTION 78-24-2, UTAH CODE: ANNOTATED, 1953. 
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At the trial of this case it was stipulated and ad-
mitted by both the plaintiff and the defendant that lone 
M. Overfield is the wife of C. P. Overfield, and that lone 
M. Overfield is the daughter of Fannie P. Morrison, and 
that S. W. Morrison, Jr. is the son of Fannie P. 
Morrison, and both are h·eirs and beneficiaries in the 
estate of Fannie P. Morrison, deceased, (Tr. 16), and 
as a matter of fact, and it is not disputed, that they are 
the sole heirs and beneficiaries of the ·estate of Fannie 
P. Morrison. Both S. W. Morrison, Jr. and lone M. 
Overfield derive their interest in said estate from their 
mother, Fannie P. Morrison, and subject to the rights 
of creditors, the costs and expenses of administration, 
they will be the recipients of all the property belonging 
to the estate of their mother, Fannie P. l\Iorrison. 
In the case of Maxfield vs. Sainsbury, 110 Utah 
280, 172 Pac. 2nd 122, which is cited by the appellant 
and construing Section 78-24-2, Utah Code Annotat~ed, 
1953, it is stated as follows: 
"The purpose of the statute is to guard 
against the temptation to give false testimony 
in regard to a transaction with a deceased person 
by the surviving party when the transaction is 
involved in a law suit and death has sealed the 
mouth of the other party." 
In this case the co-adn1inistrator of the estate of 
Fannie P. Morrison, deceased, is se·eking judgment 
against the adn1inistrator of the Overfield estate and 
if successful there 'vould be subtracted fro1n the Over-
estate assets no\v elaimed by the Overfield Estate, and 
which are part of the Overfield estate. 
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Continuing further in the opinion the Court states: 
"For the purpose of clarification, we shall 
eliminate the parts of the statute which do not 
have a bearing on our question. It then reads: 
The following persons cannot be witnesses: 
* * * * * 
(3) A party to any civil action * * * and 
any persons directly interestf~n the event there-
of * * * when the adverse party in such action 
* * * claims or opposes, sues or defends * * * 
as the executor * * * of any deceased person, 
* * * as to any statement by * * * such de-
ceas'ed * * * person * * * which must have 
been equally within the knowledge of both the 
witness and such * * * deceased person unless 
* * * called to testify th'ereto by (the executor)." 
Morrison is attempting to prove the transaction 
purportedly entered into with Overfield through his 
testimony and the testimony of lone M. Overfi'eld, wife 
of the decedent. At least this is the offer he is making. 
Morrison, as co-administrator, has a direct interest in 
this action and th'e alleged transaction involving the 
Overfield Estate. He is the plaintiff in this action. 
He is basing his claim for suit entirely upon an alleged 
transaction between himself and Overfield. He is of-
fering testimony of a co-administrator. Whether he 
will be able to produce such testimony is problematical, 
but assuming it was produced, the other co-administrator 
has a direct interest in the action. The matters per-
taining to the alleged transaction are equally within 
the knowledge of the offered witnesss and the deceased. 
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S. W. Morrison, Jr. and lone ~I. Overfield, as indi-
viduals, are both interested directly in the transaction 
involved in this action and the outcome tlrereof. They 
will be the owners of all the property in the estate 
of Fannie P. Morrison after creditors are satisfi'ed, 
funeral expenses paid and probate proceedings com-
pleted. Morrison and his sister do not have a small 
interest in the estate, they are to be the recipients of 
the whole estate. The degree of the inter:est which such 
witness has in the transaction and in the final adjudi-
cation of an action should be taken into consideration 
in determining whether such witness is eligible to testify 
against a deceased person. To permit testimony of 
such person and under such conditions opens the door 
for the giving of false testimony in regard to a trans-
action with a deceas'ed person and nullifies the very 
purpose for which the so-called Dead Man's Statute 
was enacted. 
The offered witnesses were prop'erly excluded from 
testifying as to the purported agreement alleged to 
have been entered into between C. P. Overfield and 
Fannie P. Morrison in her lifetime. 
Plaintiff claims the loan of $3,500.00 to Fannie P. 
Morrison was consumated by C. P. Overfield; that lone 
M. Overfield acted as agent. This the defendant denies, 
but assuming that the loan was made as alleged, de-
fendant contends that the offer of testimony made by 
the plaintiff contradicts the alleged agency. It" it stated 
(Tr. 18) in the offer that on the 5th day of May, 1941, 
Fannie P. Morrison, r'epresented by Seth W. Morrison, 
applied to lone M. Overfield for a loan of approximately 
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$3,500.00. lone M. Overfield, it is claimed, stated she 
would be unable to make such loan from her own per-
sonal funds, but would call her husband to see if he 
would. She was advised that she might make a loan 
(Tr. 19). lone M. Overfield made the loan. Sh'e de-
livered a check, or checks, to S. W. Morrison, Jr., ag-
gregating $3,500.00. The stock was delivered to lone 
M. Overfield (Tr. 19). lone M. Overfield signed a paper, 
or receipt, acknowledging deposit of the shares of stock 
as collateral for the loan (Tr. 19). Later after the 
death of Mrs. Morrison, it is claimed, Overfield asked 
what the assets of the estate consisted. S. W. Morrison, 
Jr. listed various mining stocks and mentioned the 
stock pledged with Mrs. Overfield (Tr. 20). 
Later in 1942, and in years subsequent thereto, it 
is claimed, S. W. Morrison, Jr., inquired of his· sister, 
lone J\II. Overfield, concerning the situation regarding 
the stock of the Independent Coal and Coke Company, 
and it is further claimed that Mrs. Overfield promised, 
or assured him that any matters in connection with 
the sam'e would be taken care of or straightened out 
relative to the same. (Tr. 20). 
The offer further states that lone M. Overfield and 
C. P. Overfield either maintained a joint Bank account 
at the Irving Trust Company, or that funds in an ac-
count of Mrs. Overfield in fact were those of her hus-
band, subject to withdrawal by her with his consent. 
(Tr. 20). The whole alleged transaction, according to 
the offer, was with lone M. Overfield individually and 
not with C. P. Overfield. Whether the purported mon'ey 
loaned came from an individual account of lone M. Over-
field or whether it came from a joint account with her 
' 
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husband, or whether it came from an account of Mrs. 
Overfield, which was in fact lrer husband's, subject to 
withdrawal by her upon his express consent, is of little 
consequence to prove an agency. She made the pur-
ported loan according to the offer. She delivered the 
checks. The stock was delivered to lone M. Overfield. 
(Tr. 20). There is no evidence or offer of evidence 
that C. P. Overfield ever came into possession of the 
stock. The stock claimed was transferred directly from 
the nam'e of Fannie P. Morrison, prior to her death, to 
lone M. Overfield and to her two daugthers. Plaintiff 
admits that the stock was never in the name of C. P. 
Overfield. ( Tr. 23). lone M. Overfield and her 
daughters received the dividends alleged to have been 
paid from the year 1941, and apparently are still re-
ceiving the dividends therefrom. (Tr. 20). 
Morrison, the co-administrator, claimnd he had no 
knowledge that the stock had be'en transferred to lone 
M. Overfield and her two daughters. As a~nistrator 
of the estate of Fannie P. Morrison, he would, or should 
have known that the stock had be'en transferred to some-
one otherwise he, as administrator, would have been re-
ceiving the dividends during this time. 
The burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to estab-
lish facts suffici'ent to sustain the complaint by pre-
ponderance of the evidence. These facts cannot be 
sustained upon mere speculation or inference. There 
is no evidence presented or offered to establish the claim 
upon which this action is founded. 
The plaintiff cites certain authorities 1n which it 
is held that the husband or 'vife, acting as agent for the 
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other spouse, was competent to testify as to trans-
actions had with a deceased p1erson. 
In the case of Porter vs. Dunn, 30 N. E. 122, the 
husband sued on a common law right to avail himself of 
the profit or benefit from the wife's services as a nurse 
for a deceas'ed person, and in permitting the wife to 
testify the Court held that this was a right which was 
independent of any claim which the wife individually 
had and pern1itted the testimony. 
In the case of Whitman vs. Foley, 26 N. E. 725, the 
husband had no interest in the claim, and the court per-
mitted him to testify. 
In the case of Severcool vs. Wilsey, 39 N. Y. Supp. 
413, it was held that the spouse, as agent, had no interest 
in the matter direct or financial. 
None of thes1e cases are in point with the instant 
case. Both S. W. Morrison, Jr. and lone M. Overfield 
stand to gain a direct financial interest if the claim of 
the co-administrator in the Morrison estate is estab-
lished, and, therefor'e, neither of these persons should 
be permitted to testify in this matter. 
We believe that the offer of testimony made by the 
co-administrator of lone M. Overfi'eld is overstated; 
that the co-administrator will be not be able to produce 
her testimony as offered. Further it is the contention 
of the defendant that lone M. Overfield, wife of C. P. 
Overfield, would not be a competent witness under the 
provisions of the Statutes of the State of Utah, Section 
28-24-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
Plaintiff in his brief cites provisions of the Con-
10 
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stitution of the State of Utah, Sections I and II of 
Article I, and states that his rights have been violated 
because of his witn1esses being barred from testifying. 
In answer to this, defendant contends that no consti-
tutional rights of the plaintiff have been violated at his 
trial in the District Court because of the ruling that 
S. W. Morrison, Jr. and lone M. Overfi'eld were not 
competent to testify. He was permitted to offer testi-
mony in proof of his action. He was not barred from 
prosecuting his claim. The mere fact that certain 
testimony offered was excluded under the law did not 
take away any of his constitutional rights. 
POINT 2. 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY EITHE~R THE PRO-
VISIONS OF SECTION 78-12-25 OR SECTION 78-12-
23 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
The amended complaint of the plaintiff (paragraph 
3) alleges as follows: 
"3. During approxin1ately ~lay, 1941, said 
Fannie P. Morrison borrowed $3,500.00 from said 
Chauncey P. Overfield and to secure payment 
thereof delivered to said Chauncey P. Overfield 
as trustee under an express trust or a trust im-
plied by law, approximately 16,136 shares of 
capital stock of Independent Coal and Coke Com-
pany, a corporation, to be held by him as such 
trustee until said loan shall have been repaid 
with the right to apply the dividends upon said 
stock in repayn1ent of said loan and under the 
1 1 
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obligation to return said shares of stock to said 
Fannie P. Morrison upon repayment of said 
loan." 
The evidence introduced by the plaintiff clearly 
shows S. W. Morrison, Jr. was a stockholder of the 
Independent Coal and Coke Company from the month 
of 1\Iarch, 1941, through June, 1947. (Tr. 13). He was 
paid the same dividends per share as other stockholde-rs 
on 1000 shares of stock owned by him during this period 
of time (Tr. 12). Under the allegations of the com-
plaint the right to apply the dividends upon the stock 
in repayment of the alleged loan was granted with the 
obligation to return the stock to Fannie P. Morrison 
upon repayment of the loan. 
S. W. Morrison, Jr., the co-administrator, is a man 
of business experien.ce and well knew that the dividends 
on this stock would be payable to the person, or persons, 
in whose name, or names, the stock was registered on 
the books of the Company, and it must have been trans-
ferred to someone from the name of Fannie P. Morrison, 
otherwise he, as administrator of the estate of Fannie 
P. ~Iorrison, would have received such dividends. 
As a stockholder of the Independent Coal and Coke 
Company, he knew, according to the testimony intro-
duced by the plaintiff, that applying the dividends de-
clared and paid on the stock to the purport~ed loan of 
$3,500.00, with interest theron at 6% per annum, the 
loan would have been paid off in December, 1943, (Tr. 
21) and the obligation to return the stock accruled in 
December, 1943. Yet, knowing this, he took no legal 
action to obtain the stock. The Statute of Limitations 
12 
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started to run in December, 19·43, and the action became 
barred by either the provisions of Section 78-12-25 with-
in four years thereafter, or under Section 78-12-23 
within six years thereafter, so that even under the 
longest period of time, the claim, or action thereon, be-
came due and was barred during the month of Decem-
ber, 1949. More than nine years beyond that time 
elapsed and after the death of C. P. Overfield, before 
S. W. Morrison, Jr., as co-administrator, asserted any 
claim to the stock. C. P. Overfield is not here to defend 
this action. His mouth is closed forever. The defendant 
will discuss the equitable side of this case in the suc-
ceeding point. 
POINT 3. 
L.ACHES 
THE PLAINTIFF IS GUILTY OF LACHE'S IN 
FAILING TO ASSERT AN ALLEGED RIGHT. 
While contending that the Statute of Limitations 
clearly applies, the defendant has also pleaded laches. 
The evidence shows that the plaintiff has slept on his 
rights. Years have passed without asserting alleged 
rights, and more than seventeen years since the alleged 
transaction. No action was taken by the plaintiff to 
assert the alleged rights during the lifetime of C. P. 
Overfield. He waited until after the death of Overfield 
to bring the action. Overfield was never given the op-
portunity of refuting the claim during his lifetime. He 
is gone. His estate cannot have the benefit of the evi-
dence from hin1. It is prejudiced because of the dila-
tory acts of the plaintiff, and because of such delay 
the evidence which n1ight be available in defense of this 
13 
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action cannot be obtained. It was held in th·e case 
of Ham1nond vs. Hopkins, 143 U.S. 224, 36 L Ed 134: 
"Where the seal of death has closed the lips 
of those whose character is involved and lapse 
of time has impaired the recollection of trans-
actions and obscured their details, the welfare of 
society demands the rigid enforcement of the 
rule of diligence." 
In the case of Dennison vs. McCann, et al (Ky) 
197 So. Western 2nd 248, a daughter's action to set 
aside a de·ed executed by her mother to another daughter 
on ground of undue influence was barred by laches, 
where daughter with knowledge of the deed admit~ 
tedly waited bringing the action until after mother's 
death, a period of eighteen months. The Court said: 
"Neither can it be disputed that her delay 
has closed the mouth of the principal participant 
in the transaction she is questioning. The time 
for her to have attacked the deed was prior to 
th'e mother's death." 
In re. Grotes Estate (Pa) 135 Atl. 2nd 383. The 
Court states: 
"Laches arises when a defendant's position 
or rights are so prejudicied by length of time 
and inexcusable delay, plus attendant facts and 
circumstances, that it would be injustice to per-
mit presently the assertion of a claim against 
him.'' 
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POINT 4. 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY THE; PR,OVISIONS 
OF SECTION 25-5-4, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953. 
Section 25-5-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro-
vides: 
"CERTAIN AGREE1IENTS VOID UN-
LESS WRITTEN AND SUBSCRIBED. -In 
the following cases every agreement shall be 
void unless such agre·emnt, or some note or mem-
orandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the 
party to be charged therewith: 
(1)£very agreement that by its terms is not 
to be performed within one year from the mak-
ing thereof." 
The claim which was filed by S. W. Morrison, Jr. 
as co-administrator of the Estate of Fannie P. Morrison 
is as follows : 
"16,395 shares of stock of Inde-
pendent Coal & Coke Co. Wyo. at $1.00 
per share, par value --------------------------------$16,395.00 
Dividends retained over and above 
complete discharge of obligation for 
which the above stock was pledged ____ 28,020.34 
as collateral, "\Yith straight interest at 
6 (/o per annu1n to January 20, 1959. 
TOTAL $44,415.34 
This action is based upon a purported elain1 'vhich 
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was filed in the estate of Chauncey P. Overfield. Th'e 
clain1 is not founded upon any written instrument. The 
scope of the claim cannot be widened to include some-
thing beyond that which is stated th'erein. 
Paragraph 3 of the Amended Complaint of the 
plaintiff in this action provides as follows: 
"3. During approximately May, 1941, said 
Fannie P. Morrison borrowed $3,500.00 from said 
Chauncey P. Overfield and to secure payment 
thereof delivered to said Chauncey P. Overfield 
as trustee under an express trust or a trust im-
plied by law, approximately 16,136 shares of 
capital stock of Independent Coal and Coke 
Company, a corporation, to be held by him as 
such trustee until said loan shall have been re-
paid with the right to apply the dividends upon 
said stock in repayment of said loan and under 
the obligation to return said shares of capital 
stock to said Fannie P. Morrison upon repay-
ment of said loan." 
It will be noted that under the allegations of said 
paragraph the alleged shares of capital stock of the 
Independent Coal and Coke Company were to be held by 
th alleged trustee until said loan shall have been re-
paid with the right to apply the dividends upon said 
stock in payment of said loan. It is 'evident from the 
evidence introduced in this case that this alleged agree-
ment was not to be performed within a period of one 
year. The claim does not show that it was in writing. 
N'either is there any evidence introduced of any writ-
ing concerning this agreement. If there was any writ-
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ten instruments concerning this alleged agreement, it 
was necessary that it be incorpo·rated within the claim 
fil1ed with the administrator of the estate of Chauncey 
P. Overfield. 
Section 75-9-5 Utah Code Annotated, 19·53, pro-
vides as follows : 
"CONTENTS OF CLAil\I - VERIFICA-
TION. - Ervery claim which is due, when pre-
sented to the executor or administrator, must be 
supported by tlre affidavit of the claimant or 
someone in his behalf that the amount is justly 
due, that no payments have been made thereon 
which are not credited, and that there are no off-
sets to th'e same, to the knowledge of the affiant. 
If the claim is not due when presented, or is 
contingent, the particulars of such claim must 
be stated. When the affidavit is made by a per-
son other than the claimant he 1nust set forth 
in the affidavit th~e reason why it is not made 
by the claimant. The executor or administrator 
may also require satisfactory vouchers or proofs 
to be produced in support of the claim. If the 
claim is founded on a bond, bill, note or any other 
instrument, a copy of such instrument must ac-
company the claim, and the original instrument 
must be exhibited, if demanded, unless it is lost 
or destroyed; in which case the claimant must 
accompany his claim by his affidavit, contain-
a copy or particular description of such instru-
Inent, and stating its loss or destruction. - - - - " 
In the offer of testilnony by S. W. l\lorrison, Jr., 
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co-administrator of the estate of Fannie P. Morrison, 
at the trial of the action, and after the pleadings wete 
rnade by each party and the issues joined, an attempt 
is 1nade to show that the loan was payable on or before 
one year after th~e making of the same. This is con-
trary to Paragraph 3 of the amended complaint. The 
plaintiff is bound by the claim and by the allegations 
of the complaint. Therefore, the agreement is void 
under the Statut'e of Frauds. 
POINT 5. 
NO PROPER CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE OF 
DECEDENT UPON WHICH THIS ACTION IS 
FOUNDED HAS BEEN PRESENTED AS RE-
QUIRED BY STATUTE. 
Section 75-9-11, Utah Code Annotat'Hd, 1953, inso-
far as it is applicable to this case provides: 
"PRESENTATION A PREREQUISITE 
TO SUIT-ENFORCEMENT OF LIENS EX-
CEPTED.-N o holder of any claim against an 
estate shall maintain any action thereon unless 
the claim is first presented to the executor or 
dm .. t t " a rn1s ra or, - - - - -
In the offer made by the plaintiff at the trial 
of this action it is asserted that some written instru-
ment was executed pertaining to this alleged transaction. 
Section 75-9-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the 
contents of which are set forth in Point 4 of this Brief, 
requires that if the claim is founded upon a bond, bill, 
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note or other instrument, a copy of such instrument 
must accompany the claim and the original must be ex-
hibited if demanded unless it is lost or destroyed, and 
if lost or destroyed, claimant must accompany his 
claim by an affidavit containing a copy or particular 
description of such instrument stating its loss or de-
struction. The plaintiff has failed to conform to the 
statutory provisions in presenting his claim. 
This court in the case of General Talking Pictures 
Corporation vs. Hyatt, 144 Utah 362, 199 Pac. 2nd 147, 
held that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the 
statutory procedure for filing a claim against tlre deced-
ent's estate in that it failed to accompany its claim with 
a copy of the instrument upon which the claim was 
founded, and that because of such failure, the claim 
was not sufficient under the statute to maintain an 
action against the ex~ecutrix of the estate thereon. 
POINT 6. 
THE ACT OF S. W. MORRISON, JR., AS CO- AD-
MINISTRATOR IN FILING THE PURPORTED 
CLAIM AND COMMENCING SUIT THERON IS IN-
VALID. 
Section 75-11-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro-
vides as follows : 
''WHEN THERE~ ARE SEVERAL NAMED' 
OR APPOINTED. - When all the executors 
named are not appointed by the court, those ap-
pointed have the san1e authority to plerform all 
acts and discharge the trust required by the will 
as effectually for every purpose as if all "~ere 
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appointed and were acting togetl'!er; where there 
are two executors or administrators, the act of 
one alone shall be effectual, if the other is absent 
from the state or laboring under any legal dis-
ability from S1erving, or if he has given his co-
administrator authority in writing to act for 
both; and where there are more than two execu-
tors or administrators the act of a majority· is 
valid." 
In this case, tlreTe is no evidence before the Court 
that lone M. Overfield was absent from the State of 
Utah at the time of the filing of the claim, or the filing 
of the action, or that she was laboring under any legal 
disability from serving as such co-administrator, nor 
is there any ·evidence before the Court that she has given 
Morrison, as co-administrator, any authority in writing 
to act for the both of them in making such claim and 
filing such suit. 
In the case of Utah Loan and Trust Company, ap-
pellant vs. Robert Barbutt, respondent, 6 Utah, Page 
342, it was held that the act of one executor in executing 
a leas·e was without authority, and the lease was invalid 
because his co-executor had not signed said lease, it 
being shown that the executors were within the Territory 
of Utah and free from any legal disability, and the \ex-
ecutor signing said lease had no written authority from 
the other to sign such lease. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant states that in view of the evidence which 
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was introduced in this case by the plaintiff and under 
the defenses pleaded and raised by the d·efendant, there 
are ample grounds to sustain the judgment of the Court 
in granting a non-suit upon the grounds that there was 
no evidence to substantiate the allegations and claims 
of the complaint. The judgment of the District Court 
should, therefore, be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SA~IUEL C. POWELL 
Attorney for Respondent 
614 Eccl1es Building 
Ogden, Utah 
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